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Is This the Worst Ever?
Abstract
Every time the U.S. economy slows, pundits claim that it is the worst recession ever and will drag on much
longer than past recessions. These claims are frequently made when it is not even a recession, or after the
recession is over and the economy is in the early stages of a recovery. The "recession" of 2008 is no different. By
comparing 15 macroeconomic indicators in 2008 to the same metrics during the previous six recessions, the
authors show that the Great Capital Strike of 2008 is so far the mildest economic downturn of the last forty
years.
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E V E R Y T I M E the U.S. economy
slows, pundits claim that it is the worst
recession ever and will drag on much
longer than in the past. These claims are
frequently made when it is not even a
recession, or after the recession is over and
the economy is in the early stages of a
recovery. In October 1970, Representative
WilburMills predicted a “serious recession
if inflation is not controlled” in the New
York Times; the economy grew the next
three years in spite of accelerating infla-
tion. In April 1975, the Times wrote that
the United States is “sliding deeper and
faster into recession that is showing no
signs of bottoming out”; the recession had
ended a month earlier. In April 1980, an
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Aetna strategist wrote in the Wall Street
Journal that “the risks of a credit crunch
and a severe recession were still very high”;
the recovery was a month under way. In
October 1981, the Times reported that
“the price of lower inflation is a severe
recession and 10.1 percent unemploy-
ment, the highest rate since 1940… some
economists also argue that the outlook for
recovery is still uncertain”; the recession
was actually ending. In July 1992, theWall
Street Journal confidently asserted that
“this recession has been the longest since
before World War II”—sixteen months
after the recession had ended. In February
2003, AFL-CIO president John Sweeney
was quoted by the Times as saying,
“There’s an economic code red for
America’s working families who are in the
worst economic crisis in two decades”—a
full fifteenmonths after the recession’s end.
Today we have the Great Capital
Strike. In August 2008, Nouriel Roubini
wrote in the RGE Monitor, “At this point,
a severe recession and a severe financial cri-
sis is unavoidable.” Do you detect a com-
mon thread? Just as many teenagers take a
perverse pleasure in watching Jason killing
other teens on screen in the fortieth sequel
to Friday the 13th, many observers seem to
relish the eminent demise of the U.S econ-
omy. To put the current slowdown in per-
spective, it has yet to be categorized as a
recession, even using today’s watered-
down definition. But how bad is it?To sep-
arate myth from fact, we compared the
economic performance during the first
seven months of 2008 with U.S. recessions
of the past forty years.
According to the current definition of
the National Bureau of Economic
Research: “A recession is a significant
decline in economic activity spread across
the economy, lasting more than a few
months, normally visible in real GDP, real
income, employment, industrial produc-
tion, and wholesale-retail sales. A recession
begins just after the economy reaches a
peak of activity and ends as the economy
reaches its trough. Between trough and
peak, the economy is in an expansion.
Expansion is the normal state of the econ-
omy; most recessions are brief and they
have been rare in recent decades.” This is a
more elastic approach to defining a reces-
sion than the Bureau’s previous definition
of “two consecutive quarters of negative
real GDP growth.”
Using the current definition, there
have been six recessions over the past forty
years. The first five would be categorized as
recessions under both definitions, while
the 2001 episode was only a recession
under the new definition. Specifically, only
the first and third quarters of 2001—not
two consecutive quarters—experienced
real negative GDP growth. The key fea-
tures of the six recessions, and the first
eight months of 2008, are summarized
in Table I.
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In order to quantify the severity of the
seven events, we focused on fifteen impor-
tant metrics of economic activity. While
these metrics are not definitive, we believe
they provide a clear image of each episode.
The longest recessions occurred in 1973-
75 and 1981-82, each lasting seventeen
months. The average recession duration
has been eleven months, and the shortest
was three months. The shaded areas of our
figures indicate recessionary periods.
The greatest decline in real GDP was
a staggering -3.5 percent, and took place
in the 1973-75 recession (Figure 1). Per
capita GDP growth was roughly 1 per-
cent lower, or -4.5 percent, due to a 1
percent annual population growth.
Through July of 2008 (hereafter referred
to simply as “2008”), the current slow-
down registered a healthy 1.3 percent real
GDP growth. This means per capita
GDP is increasing by about 0.3 percent,
which belies consumer sentiment reports
but reinforces the relative strength of
today’s economy. In 2008, payroll
employment fell by 0.3 percent (Figure
2). This pales in comparison to the 3.1
percent decline registered during the
1981-82 recession. The average decline in
payroll employment has been 1.2 per-
cent, with only the brief 1980 recession
escaping without a decline in payrolls.
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Table I: “Worst ever” U.S. recessions over the past 40 years
Duration in Months 12 17 3 17 9 9 6
Change in GDP (%) -0.4% -3.5% -0.7% -2.7% -1.4% -0.2% 1.3%
Change in Payroll Employment (%) -1.2% -1.6% 0.2% -3.1% -1.1% -1.2% -0.3%
Change in Real Household NetWorth (%) 1.7% -10.1% -1.8% -1.4% -3.5% -3.4% 0.2%
Change in Auto Sales (%) -29.2% -30.4% -15.9% -12.5% -15.2% -6.2% -5.9%
Change in Industrial Output (%) -7.1% -15.0% -0.8% -8.5% -4.4% -4.0% -1.4%
Change in Real Sales by Retail Stores (%) -2.1% -9.5% -4.9% -5.1% -5.2% -1.3% -1.9%
Change in Construction Contracts for
C&I Builidings (%) -37.6% -52.2% -21.1% -41.3% -25.0% -33.6% -28.6%
Percent Real Return in S&P 500 -23.2% -39.9% -12.9% -23.2% -16.5% -11.3% -10.1%
Change in Real Median Home Price (%) -15.8% -4.0% -3.1% -8.7% -6.2% -1.1% -3.2%
Change in Real AfterTax Profit (%) -13.3% -30.4% -12.7% -6.8% -12.3% -8.3% 0.5%
Lowest Consumer Confidence Level
(Monthly) 72.4 57.6 62.1 65.7 65.1 88.6 59.1
Change in Housing Starts -17.5% -30.5% -32.7% -25.1% -31.6% 2.1% 13.7%
Highest Inflation Rate (Monthly) 6.4% 12.2% 14.6% 11.0% 6.4% 3.6% 4.9%
Highest Unemployment Rate (Monthly) 5.8% 8.3% 6.3% 10.7% 6.8% 4.8% 5.7%
12/69- 11/73- 01/80 07/81- 07/90 03/01- 01/08
11/70 03/75 03/80 11/82 03/91 11/01 07/08
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Standard & Poors, OFHEO, Linneman Associates
With housing prices tumbling and the
stock and bond markets cracking, real
household wealth has risen by just 0.2 per-
cent in 2008 (Figure 3). Thus, on a per
capita basis, real wealth has fallen by 0.8
percent. In contrast, real wealth fell by a
staggering 10.1 percent in the 1973-75
recession (11.1 percent per capita) and by
3.5 percent in the 1990-91 recession (4.5
percent on a per capita basis). The sales of
durable goods, particularly autos, general-
ly declined in the face of weak economic
conditions, as consumers forestall pur-
chases in the face of credit squeezes and
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Figure 1: Real GDP growth rate, quarterly annualized growth
Sources: BEA, freelunch.com, Linneman Associates
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Figure 2: U.S. payroll employment, year-over-year percent change
Sources: BLS, Linneman Associates
uncertain near-term income (Figure 4).
The 5.9 percent decline in unit auto sales
in 2008 is dramatic and painful, but only
about one-fifth of the 29.2 percent and
30.4 percent declines registered in 1969-
70 and 1973-75, respectively. And while
real sales by retail stores have weakened,
the 2008 decline is small relative to the
other recessionary periods, with the excep-
tion of 2001 (Figure 5).
New construction contracts for com-
mercial and office buildings have invari-
ably suffered when the economy weakens
and capital market liquidity evaporates
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Figure 3: U.S. household net worth (real–2007 $)
Sources:The Federal Reserve, Linneman Associates
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Figure 4: U.S. auto sales
Sources: BEA, freelunch.com, Linneman Associates
(Figure 6). The decline of nearly 29 per-
cent in 2008 is no exception. But the
2008 decline is not exceptionally large. In
fact, in two recessions, contracts fell by 52
percent (1973-75) and 41 percent (1981-
82) in a matter of months due to a com-
plete absence of capital. This serves as a
dramatic reminder that the Great Capital
Strike of 2007-08 is hardly the first time
that capital has disappeared seemingly
overnight (and “forever”). The -10.1 per-
cent return on the S&P 500 in 2008 is
extremely painful (Figure 7). However,
such declines are par for the very difficult
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Figure 5: U.S. real retail sales
Sources: BFA, freelunch.com, Linneman Associates
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Figure 6: Commercial and industrial construction contracts
Sources:The Conference Board, Linneman Associates
course called recession. The 1973-75
recession registered a negative return four
times as large, wiping out 40 percent of its
value in just seventeen months.
Real median home prices (measured by
the Census Bureau’s index of new residen-
tial sales) have fallen in all of the six previ-
ous recessions, with the 1969-70 recession
registering double-digit declines (Figure
8). This index is in line with the Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
Housing Price index (OFHEO HPI) but
this goes back only to 1975. The current
home price decline is “only” 3.2 percent,
R E V I E W 1 1
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Figure 7: Annualized S&P 500 returns
Sources: S&P, Linneman Associates
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Figure 8: New single-family home median sale price
Sources:The Census, Linneman Associates
which is much smaller than the decline
indicated by the frequently cited Case-
Shiller index (Table II). But this latter
index, like the NAR index, is unrepresen-
tatively loaded with sales of foreclosed
empty and speculatively owned homes,
and focuses primarily on the most over-
built housing markets. The corporate sec-
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Table II: Home price changes
Atlanta 10% -7% 10% 2% 10% -10%
Boston 13% -7% 18% -3% 15% -11%
Charlotte 9% 2% 8% 8% 19% 1%
Chicago 19% -10% 21% 1% 20% -9%
Cleveland 6% -11% 6% -1% 6% -24%
Dallas 7% -4% 6% 5% 7% -5%
Denver 8% -7% 7% 1% 4% -10%
Detroit 6% -20% 4% -7% 4% -20%
LasVegas 61% -27% 61% -12% 70% -22%
Los Angeles 52% -23% 57% -8% 49% -21%
Miami 63% -26% 54% -4% 57% -14%
Minneapolis 14% -16% 17% -2% 18% -14%
NewYork 31% -8% 33% 0% 30% -5%
Phoenix 75% -25% 63% -7% 62% -17%
Portland 34% -3% 33% 4% 30% 2%
San Diego 35% -22% 41% -11% 42% -24%
San Francisco 39% -21% 37% -3% 28% -7%
Seattle 32% -3% 30% 5% 32% 3%
Tampa 56% -21% 48% -9% 49% -19%
Washington, D.C. 49% -16% 51% -5% 53% -14%
Case-Shiller OFHEO NAR
Market YE 2003-05 YE 2006-03/08 YE 2003-2005 YE 2006-03/08 YE 2003-2005 YE 2006-03/08
% change % change % change % change % change % change
Sources: Standard & Poors, OFHEO, NAR, Linneman Associates
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Profits After Tax Undistributed Profits
Figure 9: YOY percent change in real after-tax corporate profits
Sources: BFA, freelunch.com, Linneman Associates
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Figure 11: Historical crude oil price per barrel
Sources: Global Financial Database, International Energy Agency, Linneman Associates
tor as a whole registered a modest real
after-tax profit increase of 0.5 percent in
2008, in spite of staggering losses in the
financial sector (Figure 9). This is in con-
trast to the 30 percent and 13 percent real
declines in after-tax profit witnessed in the
1973-75 and 1969-70 recessions, respec-
tively. Consumer confidence in 2008
plummeted to levels not seen since the
recessions of 1973-75 and 1980 (Figure
10). Interestingly, all three periods share
abnormally high oil and gasoline prices,
serious geo-political disturbances, domes-
tic political uncertainty, and constipated
capital markets (Figure 11).
In many ways, the prolonged presi-
dential campaign of 2007-2008, com-
bined with the chaos in post-war Iraq
and Afghanistan, echo the collapse of the
Nixon-Agnew administration amidst the
VietnamWar, and the global ineptness of
the Carter administration (remember the
Iranian hostage crisis?). Today’s anemic
rate of housing starts is breathtaking,
particularly after the giddy starts regis-
tered just two years earlier (Figure 12).
However, the percentage declines in
2008 are similar to those registered in the
1969-70 recession, and about half or
more of the declines in 1973-75, 1980,
1981-82, and 1990-91. Only the 2001
recession witnessed an increase in hous-
ing starts.
Inflation, once again, has reared its
ugly head in 2008, with annual inflation
reaching 4.9 percent as measured by CPI
including food and energy (Figure 13).
But this rate is just one-third of inflation
registered in the 1980 recession, and well
below the double-digit rates of 1973-1975
and 1981-1982. How quickly we forget
what real inflation looks like. The U.S.
unemployment rate rose to 5.7 percent in
2008: high, but well below rates seen dur-
ing previous recessions (Figure 14).
Particularly noteworthy in this regard are
the continental European-like 8 percent
unemployment rate registered in 1973-
1975, and the double-digit unemploy-
ment rate registered in 1981-1982.
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Figure 12: Single-family home starts
Sources:The Census, Linneman Associates
When viewed as a whole, how does the
current U.S. economic situation (which
may still worsen) compare to past reces-
sions? Clearly things are not good, and the
Great Capital Strike merits a position on
the list of worst U.S. economies of the past
forty years. But it is very clearly (at least so
far) far from the worst. To demonstrate
this, we ranked each of the seven episodes
on a scale of one to seven (seven for the
worst, six for the second worst, etc.) for
each of the selected fifteen metrics. The
worst possible score is 105 (the worst score
for each of the selected 15 metrics), while
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Figure 13: All items consumer price index,YOY percent change
Sources: BLS, freelunch.com, Linneman Associates
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Figure 14: Unemployment rate
Sources: BLS, freelunch.com, Linneman Associates
the best possible score is fifteen (the least
bad on each of the fifteen selected met-
rics). The total score for each of the seven
episodes is displayed at the bottom of
Table III.
Far and away, the worst recession of the
past forty years appears to have occurred in
1973-75, with the second-worst taking
place in 1981-82. The 96.5 rank score for
the 1973-75 recession is reinforced by the
fact that it was ranked the worst in ten out
of fifteen selected metrics, and was never
the best in any category. In contrast, the
Great Capital Strike is (so far) the mildest,
with a score of 32. Though it is ranked
sixth in consumer confidence, it is not the
worst in any of the categories. The current
period has exhibited the strongest growth
in GDP, auto sales, S&P returns, and after-
tax profits (all in real dollars), compared to
the previous six recessions.
C O M M E R C I A L
R E A L E S T A T E
Turning to commercial real estate markets,
it is impossible to compile the data neces-
sary to fully compare across these seven
episodes. However, as long-time observers
1 6 Z E L L / L U R I E R E A L E S T A T E C E N T E R
Table III: “Worst ever” U.S. recessions over the past 50 years
Duration in Months 5 6.5 1 6.5 3.5 3.5 2
Change in GDP (%) 3 7 4 6 5 2 1
Change in Payroll (%) 4.5 6 1 7 3 4.5 2
Change in Real Household NetWorth (%) 1 7 4 3 6 5 2
Change in Auto Sales (%) 6 7 5 3 4 2 1
Change in Industrial Output (%) 5 7 1 6 4 3 2
Change in Real Sales by Retail Stores (%) 3 7 4 5 6 1 2
Change in Construction Contracts
for C&I Builidings (%) 5 7 1 6 2 4 3
Percent Real Return in S&P 500 5.5 7 3 5.5 4 2 1
Change in Median Home Price (%) 7 4 2 6 5 1 3
Change in Real AfterTax Profit (%) 6 7 5 2 4 3 1
Lowest Consumer Confidence Level (Monthly) 2 7 5 3 4 1 6
Change in Housing Starts 3 5 7 4 6 1 2
Highest Inflation Rate (Monthly) 3.5 6 7 5 3.5 1 2
Highest Unemployment Rate (Quarterly) 3 6 4 7 5 1 2
Total Rank Score 62.5 96.5 54 75 65 35 32
Number ofWorsts 1 10 2 3 0 0 0
Number of Bests 1 0 4 0 0 6 4
12/69- 11/73- 01/80 07/81- 07/90 03/01- 01/08
11/70 03/75 03/80 11/82 03/91 11/01 07/08
RANK ORDER (7 isWorst; 1 is Best)
Sources: BEA, S&P, OFHEO, NAR, Linneman Associates
and participants, we offer our views. First,
consistent with the sharp declines previ-
ously documented in commercial and
industrial contracts, each episode was
painful for developers. We lived through
our first real estate recession in 1969-70.
In some ways, it was just a “blip on the
radar screen,” in that there was “only” a
short-lived 37.6 percent decline in con-
struction activity, and no substantial
change in lending activity.
Atlanta offers an interesting example of
the effects of recession on real estate. In
1969-70, if you asked developers in
Atlanta about the recession, most would
have responded: “What recession?” Of
course, things were not as rosy in the
Midwest and Northeast, but all in all, it
was not a deep decline. This cockiness left
most developers ill-prepared for the deep
recession of 1973-75. Atlanta experienced
a huge construction boom post-1970,
with 40,000 apartments permitted in
1972 alone. Many were condominiums
and townhome developments. Then,
seemingly out of nowhere, the recession of
1973-75 struck. It was such a disaster that
it was 1979 before there was any apprecia-
ble construction activity in the Atlanta area
for all building types. And Atlanta, Texas
and California were the “boom” markets
in these dark times. More than one-half of
the real estate developers and home
builders went bankrupt or left the busi-
ness; the Atlanta condominium business
was so damaged in this period that there
was no appreciable condominium devel-
opment until the mid-1990s. Commercial
real estate values plummeted by 25 percent
to 30 percent, and foreclosures and work-
outs (especially for condo projects) were
the program du jour. There was no capital
available for new construction, except for
build-to-suit projects. In 1976, Post
Properties permitted and closed on a 276-
unit apartment development (PostWoods)
financed by Manufacturers Hanover
Bank—the only multifamily permit issued
over a three-year period in metro Atlanta.
Economic conditions in 1980-82 were
unique for the commercial real estate
industry in that the recession was entirely
due to monetary policy and had nothing
to do with supply and demand fundamen-
tals. There was solid pent-up demand for
space on the heels of the slowdown of the
mid-1970s. Unfortunately, rampant infla-
tion caused Fed chairman Paul Volker and
the Federal Reserve to use a sledgehammer
in the battle against inflation. Bank inter-
est rates for construction loans were based
on a 16 percent prime rate.
Post Properties did a transaction for a
small apartment project with 50 percent
debt at a 19 percent interest rate.The good
news was that because there was so little
development and so much demand, the
project worked.
In 1987, there was a change in the tax
treatment for commercial real estate that
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set the stage for a disastrous real estate
downturn nationally. Absent tax benefits
and in the teeth of a difficult financing
market, real estate “suddenly” became very
illiquid. The savings and loan industry lit-
erally disappeared, and most banks and life
companies abandoned the real estate mar-
ket. Capital for commercial real estate
completely evaporated.We view July 1990
through March 1991 as the second-worst
recession as it pertains to commercial real
estate. This recession heralded the end of
an era of commercial real estate financing,
requiring the evolution of entirely new
sources of capital.
Like many real estate owners, Post
Properties went public as a REIT in
1993 simply because there was no viable
alternative capital source at that time.
For many real estate owners, it was as
Stan Ross once stated: “Do you want to
file a Chapter 11 or an S-11?” It took
some seven to eight years for a new era of
real estate capital to evolve, characterized
by REITS, CMBS, and private equity
funds. The 2001 recession had only a
limited affect on most real estate mar-
kets, primarily affecting the travel and
lodging sector, Silicon Valley, SOMA in
San Francisco, and New York City real
estate. However, capital flows remained
plentiful and real estate sales abounded.
The current episode has affected the
for-sale housing markets in a way that was
predictable. The generous availability of
financing to home buyers (including
“investment” purchasers), no-document
loans, and customers walking out of clos-
ings with large sums of money clearly fore-
shadowed the current depression in the
for-sale business. It will be many years
before the for-sale markets, particularly for
condos, regain such giddy heights. In fact,
we suspect it will be another decade before
we again have a healthy condominium
business. However, thus far the Great
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Table IV: Commercial real estate comparison
Office vacancy 19% 13.20%
Office pipeline 4.50% 1.50%
Hotel occupancy 61.90% 63.10%
Hotel pipeline 4% 2.50%
Apartment vacancy 7.30% 8.0%
Apartment pipeline 2.50% 1%
Mortgage delinquency 7-14% 0.03-0.50%
Real cap rate spread 200 bps 300 bps
Mortgage availability None Cash flow only
Equity availability None Substantial but waiting
Sales activity Only distressed Limited
1991 2008
Sources: CBRE, SmithTravel Research, Lodging Econometrics, NCREIF, Census, HUD, Linneman Associates
Capital Strike has largely caused develop-
ment to be put on hold as people wait to
see how things evolve. Also, cap rates have
increased by 5 percent to 20 percent, and
there are few transactions. The apartment
business remains solid, but we suspect we
have yet to see the end of this cycle.
Table IV compares the early 1990s real
estate depression and the Great Capital
Strike. While real estate fundamentals
weakened in 2008 as the economy slowed,
the run-up in construction costs during
the previous two years have kept construc-
tion pipelines conservative. As a result,
R E V I E W 1 9
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Figure 15: Real estate capital sources, 2007 ($ millions)
Sources: Roulac Global Places, ADLI, CMSA/Trepp Database, CMA, the Federal Reserve, FannieMae.com, IREI, NAREIT,
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Real Capital Analytics
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Figure 16: Annual flows to real estate, real - 2007 $
Sources: Roulac Global Places, ADLI, CMSA/Trepp Database, CMA, the Federal Reserve, FannieMae.com, IREI, NAREIT,
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Real Capital Analytics
although vacancies have risen, vacancy
spikes will be relatively muted due to lim-
ited new supply. And development plans
are being scuttled everywhere, particularly
in the hotel sector, due to greater market
transparency. In almost every way, at least
so far, the early 1990s was objectively
much worse than today for commercial
real estate. Real estate capital markets are
very difficult today, with limited debt
availability and wide debt spreads the
norm. However, debt remains available for
cash flow properties today, although at
much higher coverage ratios, while equity
remains plentiful, particularly at private
equity firms (Figures 15-16). While it is
not pretty today, it stands in stark contrast
to the early 1990s, when neither debt nor
equity was available at any price.
We are optimistic that the commer-
cial real estate market will fare better
during the Great Capital Strike than in
either the 1970s or 1990s, as the usual
culprit for prolonged real estate prob-
lems is overbuilding (Figure 17). But
other than single-family and condo-
miniums, there has been relatively
modest supply growth. Therefore, the
market observers who predict that there
is yet a “second shoe to drop” in the
commercial area similar to the early
1990s appear to be either misinformed
or lack an understanding of the source
of commercial real estate woes. In both
1973-75 and 1990-96, we had substan-
tial overbuilding and a severe capital
shortage, which accentuated liquidity
problems, and the length of and severi-
ty of these downturns. Today, we have
little excess supply, and we have some
liquidity to prevent widespread defaults
and bankruptcies.
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Figure 17: Cash flow cap rate spreads over 10-yearTreasury, 18-month lag
Sources: NCREIF, Linneman Associates
L E S S O N S L E A R N E D
It is tough out there, and may get tougher.
But we have survived much worse
economies and commercial real estate
markets over the last forty years. In fact, we
not only survived, but we subsequently
soared to undreamed-of new heights.
Simply stated, tough economic times end,
and the economy grows again, as capital
creates new channels through which to
flow. As domestic demand in India and
China evolves, the world economy is per-
forming better than during past U.S.
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Figure 19: Manufacturing as a percentage of total employment, with trendline
Sources: BLS, Linneman Associates
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Figure 18: Increase in world GDP
Sources:World Economic Outlook database, Linneman Associates
downturns (Figure 18). This continued
foreign growth is a mild buffer to our slow-
down. Also of relevance is the fact that the
United States (and the world) is ever less-
dependent on manufacturing.
In the worst recessions of the past
forty years, manufacturing accounted for
20 percent to 25 percent of U.S. employ-
ment (Figure 19). Today, it accounts for
less than 10 percent. As the importance
of manufacturing declines, so too does
the magnitude of the economy’s cyclical
ups and downs (Figure 20). This is
because it is far easier to incrementally
expand and contract service employment
(more or fewer lawyers) than it is to
incrementally expand and contract man-
ufacturing activity, where the norm is
one more (or less) shift (or one more or
less plant). This makes incremental
increases in employment less tenuous
today, and the downs less dramatic.
Another important lesson from the
past is that recessions end well before
most observers realize they are over. In
particular, media accounts of unending
recessions and downward spirals regular-
ly appear as much as eighteen months
after the next recovery is actually under
way. In the end, “our” troubles always
seem worse than problems that hap-
pened to “them” back in the long-forgot-
ten days of yore. After all, many
observers never experienced the 1973-75
or 1981-82 recessions. And most of
those who did retain distorted memories.
Combine this with an unhealthy dose of
Boomer narcissism (“What happens to
me is always the most intense”) and you
grasp why people today think the Great
2 2 Z E L L / L U R I E R E A L E S T A T E C E N T E R
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
P
er
ce
n
t
Figure 20: Services as a percentage of total employment, with trendline
Sources: BLS, Linneman Associates
Capital Strike is the worst ever. But it is
not. It is not even close to the worst of
the past forty years. For example, while
observers fret that the Great Capital
Strike will hurt New York City employ-
ment, they forget that the recessions of
1970, 1973-75, 1980, and 1981-82
effectively wiped out New York City’s
largest employer: manufacturing.
History suggests that unless you think
that the Great Capital Strike will yet
evolve into a repeat of the Great
Depression, it is a sucker’s bet to bet
against the U.S. economy. The United
States is fueled by too much entrepre-
neurship and innovation to stay down
for long. So stay liquid, be patient, and
focus on long-term growth.
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